Realism

[Tmaq]

Hey.

There has to be a difference between determinism that states that the future is set, and the determinism that states that our choices are set.

because our choices don't necessarilty determine the future, things happen regardless.

for example QM is used to try to negate determinism 'the future is not set version', while it does nothing for 'determinism of our choices are set'.. since randomness doesn't equate to more freedom, in fact, I think QM maybe contradictory to 'free will' as conscious decisions based on experience definition. Doesn't randomness null the 'reasonable' decision making process by making things irrational, as in, strange random lapses in our brains causing lapses in judgement?

Randomness only proves that determinism isn't operative. It does not establish that our choices are free. (usually; "random selections" are not what most people mean by free will.)

Have you seen the "Newcomb's Paradox" thread? It is impossible to reconcile the difficulties of that paradox with the determinist position.

-Tom

Err, I fail to see how you addressed my points. Flesh it out a bit.

Lets start with the distinction you have in mind, because its not clear that there is a distinction at all.

All choices are choices intended to affect the future. Nobody makes choices in the hopes of changing the past. IOW, I don't think there is a distinction between 'the future is set' and 'our choices are set.'

I think you need to flesh out that difference, because it appears to be purely semantic, but not really expressing different ideas.

-Tom

[Thank You]

Making any argument at all presupposes the faculty of choice, and its ability to change (or decide) what the future wil be.

Or, you could claim that there isn't any future yet, so you can't change it, but you can create it in making your choices, and whichever one you create is the only one there will be.

Are you suggesting I change my choice about what I consider to be true?
If so, why would you do that, if you didn't already pre-suppose free will?

Perhaps he doesn't believe in free will (as you call it without differentiating between acausal and acausal free will), but he believes that your actions are completely determined by your nature and the physical messages your body receives from the outside world. Then, perhaps, he thinks that the physical method of certain black images on a white background on a computer screen (his argument to you), will cause you to commit the action of "changing your mind."

[Tmaq]

Making any argument at all presupposes the faculty of choice, and its ability to change (or decide) what the future wil be.

Or, you could claim that there isn't any future yet, so you can't change it, but you can create it in making your choices, and whichever one you create is the only one there will be.

Are you suggesting I change my choice about what I consider to be true?
If so, why would you do that, if you didn't already pre-suppose free will?

Perhaps he doesn't believe in free will (as you call it without differentiating between acausal and acausal free will), but he believes that your actions are completely determined by your nature and the physical messages your body receives from the outside world. Then, perhaps, he thinks that the physical method of certain black images on a white background on a computer screen (his argument to you), will cause you to commit the action of "changing your mind."

You didn't answer the question.

I wasn't asking about the mechanism of communication (expressing his notions via letters on a verbal forum is obviously his choice of method), I was asking about the mechanism of goal-formation, since that is exactly where the self-referential contradictions inherent in the determinist position reside.

-Tom

[TCF]

To me, acausality smacks of supernaturalism, making it seem less plausible than the alternative. "No cause" seems too much like "God did it".

For me it's the other way around - "hidden variables did it" seems too much like "God did it". They're both immune from detection, and therefore unscientific.

[Dil]

All choices are choices intended to affect the future. Nobody makes choices in the hopes of changing the past. IOW, I don't think there is a distinction between 'the future is set' and 'our choices are set.'

our choices may or may not affect the future, I already said things can happen regardless.

determinism of the future states that only one future occurs because it's the only future that could occur, it doesn't imply intent, I don't think.

Choice is only one of the possible determinents of a future.

[Tmaq]

All choices are choices intended to affect the future. Nobody makes choices in the hopes of changing the past. IOW, I don't think there is a distinction between 'the future is set' and 'our choices are set.'

our choices may or may not affect the future, I already said things can happen regardless.

determinism of the future states that only one future occurs because it's the only future that could occur, it doesn't imply intent, I don't think.

Choice is only one of the possible determinents of a future.

I'm sorry, I still don't see a distinction...unless you are talking about the free will position, where 'choice' actually does make the future different than it would be without such acts of choice.

-Tom

[Tmaq]

Let's try this;

"Real" = "its possible to make a mistake about it."

If determinism is real, then how does someone make a mistake by believing in free will?

IOW, if its testable, not theological, please describe a test, or at least describe the price of trusting the wrong answer (because if you can't, you can't claim its not theological.)

-Tom

[vertigo]

Asking for a test for determinism seems kinda stupid. I think we agree that it's moot. It just makes a bunch of sense when you think of the world in a deterministic way. I suppose for people who are familiar with QM, thinking of the world in another way makes sense. Think of the world in the way that makes sense.

[Tmaq]

Asking for a test for determinism seems kinda stupid. I think we agree that it's moot.

You and I might agree, but several determinists, including several here, don't recognize the theolological nature of their position.

It just makes a bunch of sense when you think of the world in a deterministic way.

Of course. Just like a free will perspective makes a bunch of sense when you think of the world in a volitional way.

The relelvant issue is that such a criteria is useless for deciding which is a superior perspective, since each supports itself with equal conviction. The symmetry inherent in either self-supporting axiom cannot be used to decide which is more accurate.

I suppose for people who are familiar with QM, thinking of the world in another way makes sense. Think of the world in the way that makes sense.

Likewise, that's not a valid way to compare the two.

Recognizing that there isn't a more-general standard by which to judge one superior to the other is the recognition that its ultimately a theological question. That's what I keep trying to point out, and everyone from the determinst 'camp' keeps trying to argue with me about it. They just don't seem capable of producing an argument, however.

-Tom

[Dan Mac]

Recognizing that there isn't a more-general standard by which to judge one superior to the other is the recognition that its ultimately a theological question. That's what I keep trying to point out, and everyone from the determinst 'camp' keeps trying to argue with me about it. They just don't seem capable of producing an argument, however.

Have you considered the possibility that the problem may not be with the strength of the arguments?
Cognitive dissonance effects us all on different levels...

[Tmaq]

Recognizing that there isn't a more-general standard by which to judge one superior to the other is the recognition that its ultimately a theological question. That's what I keep trying to point out, and everyone from the determinst 'camp' keeps trying to argue with me about it. They just don't seem capable of producing an argument, however.

Have you considered the possibility that the problem may not be with the strength of the arguments?

I've not only considered it, I've said so, directly.

The issue isn't the *strength* of the arguments, its the *theological / unfalsifiable nature* of either position.

Cognitive dissonance effects us all on different levels...

Such dissonance is recognizable, and hence, eradicatable, so I don't think its correct to say that it affects us all. At the very least, it doesn't *have* to affect us all.

What's strange is a whole buch of athiests who are obviously capable of recognizing untestable notions in the expressions of theists failing to recognize the untestable nature of some of their own expressions, despite mutiple and a very diverse set of opportunities to do so.

-Tom

[Dan Mac]

But you continue to claim causality isn't demonstrable, based on worthless nuances. It's bullshit because causality can be demonstrated. Go set up some dominoes if you don't believe me.

[TCF]

But you continue to claim causality isn't demonstrable, based on worthless nuances. It's bullshit because causality can be demonstrated. Go set up some dominoes if you don't believe me.

He's talking about quantum dominoes, ie. very very very small dominoes. They don't behave deterministically.

[TCF]

Asking for a test for determinism seems kinda stupid. I think we agree that it's moot. It just makes a bunch of sense when you think of the world in a deterministic way. I suppose for people who are familiar with QM, thinking of the world in another way makes sense. Think of the world in the way that makes sense.

Well said sir!

[Dan Mac]

Arguing the macro-scale world from QM is bullshit worthy of battling francs posse.