The limitations of the property owners ability to coerce are only in place when a very important third party is there to prevent them who can also fulfill these defensive roles against people the owner wishes to coerce, namely, the state!
Really? I thought I offered at least 3 significant groups of people who would make sure that landowners wouldn't use inappropriate means of discouraging undesired use of their land, while not acting as a state (by claiming jurisdiction, as defined in my previous post). First, there are the coercees, the people whom the landowners coerce by applying inappropriate responses to unwanted land use. If the land owner wants to punish them in unjust ways, like imprisonment, then their incentive is to leave (i.e. the just punishment for unjust land use). Second, there are other land owners. If a certain landowner is imprisoning people who don't do things the way he or she likes, then that landowner is decreasing participation in other landowners' rent taking or social organizing plan. Thus, these landowners have an incentive to prevent the use of inappropriate, coercive punishments for violation of property rights. Finally, landowners themselves have an incentive not to punish people in inappriate ways for property rights violations. It's a lot cheaper to kick people off your land to prevent them from using it in ways you don't like than it is to imprison or enslave them there while still ensuring that they don't use the land in undesired ways.
In the absence of a state that can enforce the necessary rules about use of property and the rights of owners, they tend to develop into fully functioning states of their own, complete with militaries.
No, they only develop their own militaries in response to the presence of the state. Note that "organized crime" is a meaningless term in the absence of a state. And the industries from which organized crime makes money, such as prostitution and drugs, tend to be much more peaceful (without industry leaders who own militaries) in the absence of state intervention.
Microsoft has put forth a generally shoddy product
Bullshit. My friends who use various Mac OSs can't even communicate fully with other people. They can't read mathtype in microsoft word documents. postscript files written in certain forms of tex won't run on their computers, etc. Creating standards is the same as creating a monopoly, except that you're giving the decision making process over to a group thato doesn't have a lot to lose by creating bad standards. If Microsoft's standardization of the industry were bad enough, they'd lose billions of dollars. (And the only reason why other OSs are better in some aspects is that they have to be, or there'd be no reason to buy them.)
Social anarchism doesn't provide for private property, so I don't see how different groups could gain advantages in access.
But people still use resources, don't they? And by what process is it determined that a certain group will get to use a resource? In many cases (and not just in the meritocratic system proposed by anarcho-capitalists), there's still a way to gain an advantage in this process.
I am somewhat sympathetic to a syndicalist flavor of anarchism
I recently took to describing myself as capitalist in my foundations, and syndicalist in my goals. (I had been describing myself as an anarcho-syndicapitalist.) Within a capitalist framework, if workers don't own their company, I think that organized labor should favor profit sharing incentives (which management loves to give them), because this can give them control of the company. The only problem is that labor leaders have consistently refused profit sharing in favor of medical benefits and the like.
In the case of group ownership of naturally resources, I think this derives naturally and rightfully out of private property ownership. If an individual owns a city, for instance, then he or she has to get others to live there in order to make a profit. Hong Kong and Dubai, which run budgets to maximize "state" revunue (effectively making them for-profit ventures, at least as far as taxation is concerned), show how this is done -- they charge leases on all the land they own. Thus, there is effectively no private land ownership in these places, and in order to get use of land, you have to contribute resources to a common fund which goes into improving local quality of life for everyone there. Thus, even if private claims to the use of a piece of land are "theft" from everyone else in the area who (before the claim) had just as much right to that land as the claimant, the private city model ensures that those from whom the land is stolen get compensated (because the theif has to put money into a privately administered public fund). (There's still the issue that some people from whom the land was stolen might not agree to the use of the public funds, so that the theif hasn't really compensated them. Hong Kong, Dubai, and Singapore don't really solve this problem, but my plan of paying dissenters to leave would. It would ensure that, eventually, everyone living in those places basically consents to how public funds are used.)