Realism

[TCF]

Usually so, but we could easily rig up an experiment in the lab where a quantum system gets to choose between "left" and "right". If it chooses "left", we set of a hydrogen bomb, and if it chooses "right", we don't. Then causality is busted on a macro-scale too.

[Thank You]

I was asking about the mechanism of goal-formation, since that is exactly where the self-referential contradictions inherent in the determinist position reside.

Not at all. You don't have to admit that your goals came from yourself (without any prior cause) to admit that you want to achieve them. In fact, all you need is to admit that they come from yourself at all. Then they are really your goals, and it is accurate to say that you want to achieve them, regardless of the prior causes of this desire.

[Tmaq]

But you continue to claim causality isn't demonstrable

What I've argued is that 'causality' isn't meaningful, and I'll go further and claim that 'causality' doesn't apply to the 'causality' argument, which means the determinist position is circular...like most theistic philosophies which attempt to develop a patina of objectivity.

Your abstraction/label about the your pattern-recognition doesn't get to any specifics, which is where any testing among alternative *explantions* for those patterns must occur. You are arguing in a circle if you say 'causality' causes those patterns. You assume as true the thesis on the table.

If I could make a mistake, by trusting the wrong notion (where determinism and free will are the alternatives), then the wrong answer will *cause* (or at least, result in) a vilolation of expectations, and that violation becomes an avenue by which to decide which notion is more accurate, more fitting with experience, a better model of how the universe actually operates.

I've asked you to describe such a test of the alternatives, or describe the price of the mistake if I choose wrong - IOW, what *specific* disadvantageous outcome would be *casued* by trusting the erroneous alternative? If you can't describe even a single one, then you have no reasons by which to develop trust in one or the other; you only faith; a theological axiom.

Your ability to avoid the question, seemingly without realizing that you are avoiding it, already makes it appear to be an ideological or theological axiom which you seek to protect from emperical testing.

Act now, and you can still salvage your reputation for being rational about this issue.

It's bullshit because causality can be demonstrated.

On top of the criticism above, even 'causality' cannot be demonstrated - as always, you've still got the inductive problem; correlation is not causation.

Put another way, if 'causality' is a scientific, as opposed to theological, notion, then some conceivable outcome could conceivably prove it wrong.

If there is no conceivable set of events which could prove 'causality' false, then its also meaningless to talk about demonstrating it at all. When a notion is irrefutable because it is so broad, general, or vague that it can cover any conceivable event, then it is completely useless for anticipating events, or making any decisions.

The notion of 'god' faces both those problems, and nothing you've ever said prevents 'causality' or determinism from falling into the exact same mistakes.

-Tom

[Tmaq]

I was asking about the mechanism of goal-formation, since that is exactly where the self-referential contradictions inherent in the determinist position reside.

Not at all. You don't have to admit that your goals came from yourself (without any prior cause) to admit that you want to achieve them. In fact, all you need is to admit that they come from yourself at all. Then they are really your goals, and it is accurate to say that you want to achieve them, regardless of the prior causes of this desire.

Avoiding the question about the details of the mechanism of goal-formation is the *opposite* of addressing my point about the lack of details in the determinist position about the mechanism of goal-formation.

-Tom

[Tmaq]

Its been 6 months.

It appears quite likely that our question "Is determinism a theological belief" has been answered in the affirmative, as nobody who once disagreed continues to contend the point...or do they?

-Tom

[Cory Duchesne]

Its been 6 months.

It appears quite likely that our question "Is determinism a theological belief" has been answered in the affirmative, as nobody who once disagreed continues to contend the point...or do they?

-Tom

Obviously. I'm waiting for a reply to this latest post of mine.

I'll reiterate here:

1) we do not choose to be born 2) We do not choose to experience the very first sensations we experience. 3) When we experience these very first sensations, we are experiencing distinctions, and we are doing so without 'recognition' of them. This is because the act of recognizing involves the identification of something previously seen. It is when we identify for the first time (something that was previously seen) that logic is first established, and this is involuntary - because the very first things recognized - pain, cold, pleasure, warm, mother, father, good tasting food, bad tasting food, etc - - all of those things are not the baby's choice, but they are imposed and discovered against his will.

I don't neccesarily believe strongly in determinism - - but until there is evidence in favor for indeterminism, I see little reason for believing in it either. Indeterminsim to me seems like believing in God or faeries. It totally contradicts everything we know about psychology, biology, physics, etc.

[Cory Duchesne]

Not to mention the violation 'indeterminism' makes on cause and effect. The present moment is the product of the past, the present if the effect of the past. Effects are determined by Causes.

[Tmaq]

Not to mention the violation 'indeterminism' makes on cause and effect. The present moment is the product of the past, the present if the effect of the past. Effects are determined by Causes.

Yes, that is the relevant premise behind the fatalistic belief.

The many examples of causeless effects all completely refute that premise.

Hence, determinism / fatalism cannot be an accurate or complete account of events.

-Tom

[Tmaq]

Its been 6 months.

It appears quite likely that our question "Is determinism a theological belief" has been answered in the affirmative, as nobody who once disagreed continues to contend the point...or do they?

-Tom

Obviously. I'm waiting for a reply to this latest post of mine.

I'll reiterate here:

Don't bother - I'll respond to the question of cognition, categorization et al, in the relevant thread.

I don't neccesarily believe strongly in determinism - - but until there is evidence in favor for indeterminism

"Until"? That evidence has existed for nearly a century, AKA Quantum Mechanics.

It totally contradicts everything we know about psychology, biology, physics, etc.

That is false. Check out "Newcomb's Paradox" for an illustration of Karl Popper's rejection of determism on purely logical grounds. Quantum Mechanics refutes it on emperical grounds.

-Tom

[Cory Duchesne]

I don't neccesarily believe strongly in determinism - - but until there is evidence in favor for indeterminism

"Until"? That evidence has existed for nearly a century, AKA Quantum Mechanics.

Are you referring to evidence which suggest there is indeterminism in quantum theory - and this indeterminism allows free will to take place? Is that your line of thinking?

[Tmaq]

I don't neccesarily believe strongly in determinism - - but until there is evidence in favor for indeterminism

"Until"? That evidence has existed for nearly a century, AKA Quantum Mechanics.

Are you referring to evidence which suggest there is indeterminism in quantum theory

No, it doesn't 'suggest' anything of the sort. It proves it; Unpredictable in pure principle. You should look into it.

and this indeterminism allows free will to take place?

Free will cannot be based on randomness, at least not how most people conceive of it.

The point is that QM proves fatalism or determinism utterly false; the universe is neither wholly deterministic nor completely predictable.

Are you asking me to explain what I consider a viable mechanism for the operation of free will?

-Tom

[Cory Duchesne]

I don't neccesarily believe strongly in determinism - - but until there is evidence in favor for indeterminism

"Until"? That evidence has existed for nearly a century, AKA Quantum Mechanics.

Are you referring to evidence which suggest there is indeterminism in quantum theory

No, it doesn't 'suggest' anything of the sort. It proves it; Unpredictable in pure principle. You should look into it.

David Bohm has a Quantum theory based on hidden variables, his theory makes predictions just as well as the Copenhagen interpretation - and it interprets the totality as determined. You should look into it.

and this indeterminism allows free will to take place?

Free will cannot be based on randomness, at least not how most people conceive of it.

The point is that QM proves fatalism or determinism utterly false; the universe is neither wholly deterministic nor completely predictable.

I agree it's not predictable, but that doesn't mean it isn't determined.

Are you asking me to explain what I consider a viable mechanism for the operation of free will?

-Tom

I'd like you to explain it.

[Tmaq]

Actually, I was re-perusing this very thread, and discovered that every single issue you've raised has already been adequtely covered, including my description of free will based on the ability to invoke the principle of synergy.

So check it out at your leisure, then c'mon back with any questions or objections you might have.

-Tom

[Tmaq]

Bump

[vertigo]

Hey Tmaq, it seems you wish for this conversation to continue, so I have two questions.

First, why is Newcomb's paradox a paradox? Surely if the oracle is accurate, choosing box B will return $1M, whereas choosing both will return $1k. What is paradoxical about that? Is it because the prediction has already been made but supposedly one can still choose either? Wouldn't that be an argument for determinism? How is it an illustration that determinism is wrong?

Second:

It is impossible to measure simultaneously both position and velocity of a microscopic particle with any degree of accuracy or certainty.
...
In quantum mechanics, a particle is described by a wave. The position is where the wave is concentrated and the momentum is the wavelength. The position is uncertain to the degree that the wave is spread out, and the momentum is uncertain to the degree that the wavelength is ill-defined.

You said that the Uncertainty principle proves nondeterminism. How does it do that? What is the connection from this description above to your conclusion?